particular the question of how to determine the irrevocably fixed conversion rates between countries. Not only is this issue still interesting from a theoretical point of view, but it is also relevant with respect to future member countries of the EMU. Clausen (1998) discusses the "inappropriate choice of the conversion rates" between two small countries by modelling a "devaluation" within the monetary union.
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In more abstract settings, de Grauwe (1997) , Obstfeld (1998) , and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten (1999) argue that there is a possibility of (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies on exchange rates, if the last quotations of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used as conversion rates (theoretical indeterminacy problem).
How does this paper relate to and extend the findings of papers of those different strands of the literature? First, the transition from the pre-EMU period to after the start of the monetary union is modelled explicitly. This allows to capture interdependencies between the announcement phase (from the announcement of the EMU to the end of 1998) and the time after 1 January 1999. Second, various procedures for fixing conversion rates are discussed. By doing so, results can be applied to the EMU as of 1999, but also to future members of the real world EMU or any other monetary union. This approach also allows to evaluate empirically the theoretical indeterminacy problem discussed by de Grauwe (1997) and others (as discussed in the previous paragraph). Third and most importantly, this paper focuses on interest and exchange rate impulses caused by a monetary union as such while abstracting from other potential changes (like fiscal convergence criteria, a shift in the monetary stability orientation of the European Central Bank (ECB), potential efficiency gains, or various conceivable adjustments of agents' behavior).
Sections 1 discusses the model and the simulation strategy; and section 2 presents the model changes to account for the EMU. On this basis, simulation results for interest and exchange rate impulses are justified qualitatively in section 3. Section 4 relates the simulation findings to results obtained in standard open economy macroeconomic models. The role of exchange rate expectations is emphasized and the view of the advocates of a theoretical indeterminacy problem is challenged. Section 5, again, refers to simulation results and discusses real effects qualitatively. Several channels of transmission are identified and a potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses is revealed. In section 6, qualitative findings are applied to the real world EMU. Concluding section 7 presents a summary of results, a discussion of limitations, and some general policy recommendations referring to countries joining a monetary union.
Experiment Design
In the following, the underlying economic model is characterized and the simulation strategy of constructing counterfactuals in an ex post analysis is justified.
Main Model and Simulation Characteristics
The simulation analysis presented in this paper is based on a 1991 variant of MULTIMOD (cf. IMF, 1991) , an annual econometric multi-country model. It was developed by the International Monetary Fund and is widely used for international policy analysis. 470 equations depict ten countries and regional blocs: the seven G7 countries, the rest of the OECD, the oil exporters, and the rest of the developing world. MULTIMOD incorporates rational expectations (in financial markets and the decision-making by firms and households) and complete information. This means it is a perfect foresight model requiring perfect credibility of policy decisions (e.g. on the start and membership of a monetary union).
MULTIMOD follows "the prevailing paradigm in which a broadly neoclassical view of macroeconomic equilibrium coexists with a new Keynesian view of short-to-medium term adjustment" (Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis, 1995) . It is an elaborate, dynamic version of the "modified-Mundell-Fleming" model (Krugman, 1995) combining short run demand determination and IS-LM structure with long run steady state properties determined by capital accumulation and aggregate supply. Inflation dynamics depend on capacity utiliza-tion (a Phillips curve type relationship), imported inflation effects, sticky prices and price expectations. However, for the long run, nominal neutrality is imposed (short run nominal rigidities are smoothed out over time). MULTIMOD accounts for stocks of debt, money, and net foreign assets as well as for international trade and financial flows.
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A comparative simulation analysis consists of comparing a benchmark scenario, the so-called baseline, to various alternative scenarios, here the hypothetical EMU scenarios. In principle, we can choose to conduct ex post or ex ante simulations (Wallis, 1988, p. 226) . The former are based on a historical time period (and historical baseline data), the latter on the future (and, hence, forecast baseline data). It is argued that, for the purpose of this paper, ex post simulations for the 1980s are preferable to the seemingly more realistic (ex ante) scenario for the EMU starting in 1999, or to any other (ex post) historical scenario.
The decisive drawback of ex ante simulations is that interest and exchange rate impulses caused by a monetary union would be obscured or even completely concealed. In econometric multi-country models, forecasts for the immediate future typically represent an adjustment path to a steady state equilibrium. In this version of MULTIMOD, the steady state is already reached before the start of the real world EMU in 1999. Exchange rates are constant, and interest rates are constant and equal across countries from 1997 onwards. Hence three effects would not appear in an ex ante analysis. (If the steady state were reached a few years later, that is during the first years of the EMU, effects would still be blurred.) First, the introduction of a monetary union could not have an interest equalization effect. Second, underlying appreciations and depreciations in the historical baseline would not feature in a steady state baseline. Hence, there could not be any effects caused by changes in exchange rate expectations caused by the hypothetical EMU. Third, conversion rates could be fixed exogenously at non-steady state values, but there would be no effects under endogenously determined market conversion rates (because the steady state would prevail). Furthermore, it could not be demonstrated that these three effects may be countervailing.
Simulation Scenarios
There are also reasons for choosing a particular historical time period, i.e. the 1980s instead of the 1990s, for introducing a hypothetical EMU. After 1983, the European Monetary System (EMS) was fairly stable, whereas monetary turmoil with the break-up of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and ensuing exchange rate instability, especially for the Lira, could be observed in the beginning of the 1990s. After 1992, the baseline scenario was affected by expectations caused by the announcement of the EMU. The real side, too, was suitable for conducting a simulation analysis based on the 1980s. From 1983, GDP growth rates were positive and very close in the large real world EMU member countries Italy, France and Germany (baseline data is shown in appendix A), not so much in Britain though. Hence, possible recession or overheating effects caused by a hypothetical EMU cannot be blamed on divergent underlying business cycles.
Nonetheless, by choosing the historical conditions of the 1980s as the point of reference, considerable nominal disparities among European countries (much larger than in the 1990s) are incorporated in the analysis. Due to large interest rate differentials between prospective member countries of the hypothetical EMU and exchange rates far away from Purchasing Power Parity, large adjustments are likely to be induced by the introduction of a hypothetical EMU. Hence, quantitative outcomes are exaggerated and less ambiguous, and qualitative interpretations are facilitated. Synchronized business cycles and large nominal disparities provide ideal conditions for analyzing transmission mechanisms of macroeconomic effects that are caused by the EMU (or monetary unions in general).
All in all, the baseline scenario is defined by the model specifications in MULTIMOD to capture the historical real world situation. The hypothetical EMU scenarios are to be distinguished from the baseline scenario in the following section. They are all modelled to start in 1983 and to consist of the real world EMU member countries Germany, France and Italy, but not the United Kingdom. (The smaller European countries are not accounted for separately in this version of MULTIMOD.) The decision on which country to include in the hypothetical EMU is not primarily motivated by the desire to honor the successful bid by Italy and the refusal by Britain to participate in the real world EMU. Instead, it has already been motivated by the macroeconomic constellation as of 1983.
The start of the hypothetical EMU in 1983 is preceded by a one year announcement period (1982) . It may be argued that markets predicted EMU membership for most countries more than one year in advance, and that future applications for membership will be known at least two years in advance. However, since MULTIMOD requires perfect credibility and full information (as mentioned before), the most realistic assumption is to limit the announcement period to one year. As a consequence, real world anticipation effects may be exaggerated by simulation results, because expectations switch abruptly from one (annual) period to the next and all adjustments are squeezed into one period only. Furthermore, the announcement period is characterized by flexible exchange rates. The idea is to capture anticipation effects unrestrained by government interventions in the foreign exchange markets.
Monetary Union
A common currency and a common central bank are the essential components of a monetary union. In the following, exchange rates and monetary policy in the hypothetical EMU are discussed with reference to the baseline. Three hypothetical EMU scenarios based on alternative procedures for fixing intra-EMU conversion rates are specified.
Exchange Rates
In MULTIMOD, exchange rates are determined by the open interest parity condition (relative to the US). In the baseline, there are separate exchange rate equations for France, Germany, and Italy. For the hypothetical EMU scenarios, individual exchange rates for member countries are replaced by a single Euro-$ rate (and conversion rates are used to fix each national currency to the Euro). The exchange rate of the (hypothetical) Euro vis-à-vis the US-$ depends on two components: the expected Euro-$ exchange rate for next period Ee U +1 (E is the expectation operator); and the differential between the union-wide short term interest rate i U (determined by the ECB) and the corresponding US rate i U S
. The
European (open interest parity) exchange rate equation is given by:
Normalizing the Euro at 1 DM as of 1983, the start of the hypothetical EMU, reduces the number of conversion rates needed. Three alternative procedures for fixing conversion rates are used in this paper. To stay within the logic of an annual model, all rules refer to yearly averages. As an example, the conversion rate between France (F) and Germany (G), e
F,G t≥1983
(French Franc to the Euro or DM), is specified for each case:
PPP: e
CUR means conversion at current exchange rates: conversion rates as of 1983 are set to their corresponding simulated bilateral exchange rates as of 1982, the year before the start of the hypothetical EMU. An equivalent conversion procedure in the real world would be the fixing at (annually) averaged market rates. 
Interest Rates
As for monetary policy in MULTIMOD's baseline, the behavior of the Bundesbank and the non-ERM central banks is described by monetary targeting. All other ERM member countries are assumed to commit to exchange rate targeting vis-à-vis the DM. Once the hypothetical EMU starts, the nominal interest rate in member countries is no longer determined by a national interest rate reaction function, but by the interest rate reaction function of the hypothetical ECB. The ECB commits to monetary targeting. There is no conceptual change like, for instance, a switch to inflation targeting. The common European interest rate is modelled as the instrument, and the European money stock as the (intermediate) target for obtaining its price stability objective. As for previously national central banks, the hypothetical ECB exercises full control over short term interest rates:
Under the assumption of unchanged (negative) coefficient r (from national equations), the change of the union-wide common interest rate (i shift to a higher level of stability orientationà la Bundesbank, for instance, or to a lower level is not captured in this paper. In the approach chosen, the monetary policy of the hypothetical EMU is constructed as the 'average' of historical national monetary policies.
Formally, a monetary target is specified in MULTIMOD for each country, even for ERM member countries committing to exchange rate targeting (so that the withdrawal of individual countries from the ERM could be modelled). It corresponds to the actual monetary policy in the historical baseline. Thus, the 'average' monetary policy of the hypothetical ECB is determined endogenously by aggregating national baseline targets (analogous to the aggregation of the European money stock): mt
. This approach may be criticized from two angles. First, the real world EMU has already shown to conduct more stability-oriented monetary policies. It has been said before, however, that it is not intended to model a realistic European Monetary Union. Second, simply adding up national target values given in the baseline of MULTIMOD is a crude way for describing the hypothetical ECB policy as an average of historical European monetary policies. Nonetheless, this procedure suffices to capture a crucial feature of any monetary union, the equalization of short term nominal interest rates. 
Interest Rate Impulses
The link between the common monetary policy and equalized short term interest rates is straightforward. In the simulations, averaging the monetary stability orientation of the ECB (compared to the policy stance of the -formerly independent -national central banks) produces average interest rates across the union from 1983 onwards. Relative to national baseline rates, each year interest rates fall in countries with historically high interest rates (e.g. Italy) and go up in those with traditionally low interest rates (Germany). As a result, Simulated conversion rates differ from bilateral 1983 baseline exchange rates, so that the (simulated) curves in figure 1 do not intersect any more. Both curves lie between baseline curves when moving out to the right. Note also that the distance between the two curves capturing simulation results must be "constant" from 1983 onwards, because conversion rates are fixed and interest rates are identical in the hypothetical EMU. 
Exchange Rate Impulses under PPP and CP
The underlying causality is different for endogenous (CUR) and exogenous conversion rate procedures (PPP and CP). Relative exchange rate impulses between two member countries (from 1983) can be represented by the simple quotient of baseline and simulated cross rate identities:
where e k t (l) refers to the exchange rate (at time t) of country k (k = G for Germany and k = F for France -in local currency per US-$) with l indicating whether it is a simulated 
The Role of Depreciation Expectations
The link between interest and exchange rates is analyzed in the standard theoretical literature (take the monetary model, the Mundell-Fleming model or the Dornbusch model).
In these models, we learn that expansionary monetary policy is typically associated with both a nominal depreciation and either lower or constant interest rates.
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Simulation results in this paper seem to contradict all of these models: countries with a fall in interest rates experience an appreciation, not a depreciation.
Even though exchange rates are fixed with the start of the monetary union, the comparison to (but not an application of) the aforementioned analytical models is still possible. For instance, the simulation under CUR captures a shift in monetary policy for each country in the year prior to the start of the monetary union (i.e. the announcement period In the short and long run, there are -relative to the baseline -two potentially countervailing effects on the real economy. On the one hand, there is an expansionary effect (if the reduction in nominal interest rates translates into falling real interest rates -relative to the baseline).
On the other hand, there is a contractionary impact caused by the appreciation (if the nominal appreciation is also a real one -relative to the baseline). The overall effect is not clear a priori and will be investigated in section 5.
The Role of Purchasing Power Parities
Based on the previous analysis of the link between interest and exchange rates, we can now turn to the discussion of similarities between results for endogenous and exogenous Obtaining near purchasing power parity rates under the market mechanism (i.e. the CUR conversion procedure) contradicts the theoretical indeterminacy problem: de Grauwe (1997) , Obstfeld (1998) , and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten (1999) argue that there is a possibility of (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies (on exchange rates), if the last quotations of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used as conversion rates.
This is exactly the procedure used for CUR (irrespective of the fact that annual data is used here). The simulation results in this paper show, however, that there is no such indeterminacy problem once economic interdependencies of a large model are incorporated in the analysis. In fact, one and only one outcome obtains in a perfect foresight setting. This is so, because the conversion rate in MULTIMOD must be consistent with a long run goods market equilibrium which requires "reasonable" exchange rates with respect to the real side.
For two reasons, the finding of near-purchasing power parity conversion rates under CUR is not just coincidental, but a strong empirical result. First, the solution is far away from the start values of the simulation run. Second, each simulation result is the outcome of hundreds of iterative loops of a forward-looking algorithm which has proved to be very robust. 
The Transmission of Impulses in Germany under CUR
In all scenarios, the transmission of interest and exchange rate impulses into the real economy can be summarized as follows:
Observation 5 (Transmission Mechanisms) Interest and exchange rate impulses produce real effects, which can be explained by three transmission mechanisms: a competition effect, a terms of trade effect, and a real interest rate effect.
As an example for observation 5, effects on the real economy are presented for Germanyunder CUR -in figure 2 . The representation of simulation findings is simplified by focusing Transmission of Impulses in Germany under CUR on the three already mentioned transmission mechanisms: a positive competition effect, a negative terms of trade effect on income and wealth, and a real interest rate effect that is positive in the short run, but negative in the medium and long run. The overall impact on German GDP is positive at first, but turns negative after 1985.
Relative to the baseline, the depreciation of the DM raises prices for imports, thereby causing imported inflation. Since prices are sticky, future inflation goes up as well, so do inflation expectations ( P e ↑) due to rational expectations. Hence, by definition, real interest rates r are lowered. However, at rising nominal interest rates, the net effect on German real rates is ambiguous a priori. In the short run, strong interest rate equalization effects are overcompensated due to even stronger effects on expected inflation. In the medium term, however, elevated nominal interest rates relative to the baseline dominate the behavior of real rates.
Even though real interest rates decrease in the announcement period and in the first years of the hypothetical EMU, German private investment I and consumption C (government consumption g is exogenous) stay below baseline levels throughout. This is due to a negative Supply side aspects (which are not captured in figure 2 ) reinforce the inflationary impact of the DM depreciations. Since the capital stock is systematically run down (relative to the baseline), and output increases in the announcement period and the beginning of the hypothetical EMU, capacity utilization rises until 1985 -relative to the baseline. Inflation caused by capacity utilization effects (according to the Phillips curve relationship) augments imported inflation effects. As seen above, inflation causes real interest rates to decrease in the first years despite higher nominal interest rates. After 1985, capacity utilization returns to baseline levels, thus eliminating additional inflation effects in Germany.
Impulse Transmission in the Other Cases
The transmission of impulses in France is basically a mirror image of those in Germany except that the trade balance is positive in the first few years. Nonetheless, contractionary effects in the short run are stronger than corresponding expansionary ones in Germany.
This is possible because of the rather moderate relative decrease of nominal interest rates reflecting the intermediate position of French interest rates in the historical baseline.
In Italy, results are much more clear-cut than in France and Germany. Throughout there is a negative competition effect, a positive terms-of-trade effect, and a very strong positive real interest rate effect. Overall, GDP is permanently above baseline levels. Despite a build-up of capital, capacity utilization increases (thereby pushing up costs). The ensuing inflationary impact (due to the Phillips curve relationship) is strong enough to cancel out imported disinflation effects. At inflation near baseline rates and sharply decreasing nominal interest rates, clearly, the real interest rate effect on output must be positive and very strong.
Most impulses, effects, and results (as discussed for CUR) prevail, qualitatively, under exogenous conversion procedures. The interest rate impulse remains almost unchanged, because interest equalization invariably applies to all conversion procedure. In contrast to CUR, the PPP or CP exchange rate impulse is affected by fixed conversion rates. In particular, depreciation impulses are considerably smaller for France under PPP, and for France and Italy under CP. As a result, effects are dampened, but not drastically changed.
The situation is different for Germany under CP. There is a nominal appreciation until 1986 -in contrast to the permanent depreciation under CUR. The appreciation causes a switching of signs for most variables in the short to medium term in figure 2. In the an-nouncement period and the first few years of the hypothetical EMU, disinflation is imported and reinforced by capacity utilization below baseline levels. As a result, the real interest rate effect on absorption is negative in those years, not positive as under CUR. Despite a positive terms-of-trade effect in these first years (due to imported inflation), absorption falls throughout -relative to the baseline. Overall economic activity measured by GDP permanently stays below baseline levels, although the trade balance is more positive during the entire period. (In the years with appreciations relative to the baseline, the competition effect remains positive because appreciations are overcompensated by the ensuing disinflation.)
The Interest-Exchange Trade-Off
Nominal impulses in terms of interest and exchange rates are the determinants of real effects caused by the EMU -relative to the baseline. In the case of an appreciation combined with a rise in interest rates, as for Germany under CP, the effect was unambiguously negative (except for the smaller terms of trade effect). In all other cases, there was a potential tradeoff, either between depreciations and interest rate rises relative to the baseline, or between appreciations and a drop in interest rates.
In a trade-off situation, real interest rates seem to be decisive, empirically. If one of the nominal impulses determines the effect on the real interest rate r and produces a large change in r relative to the baseline, then the overall outcome is governed by the real interest The trade-off -with respect to effects on the real economy -between interest and exchange rates is conventional wisdom. It clearly depends on the openness of a national economy. But there seems to be almost no empirical or theoretical literature. In particular, no attempt has been made, to my knowledge, to apply a formal trade-off argument to the real world EMU.
Only McRae (1998) Note that simulation results and findings of the analysis are based on relating hypothetical EMU scenarios to a reference scenario, the historical baseline. However, for the observable real world scenario of the actual EMU, there is no readily available reference scenario.
Instead, based on conjectures, a conceptual scenario with no plans for a monetary union must be constructed (in one's mind's eye).
Question 1: Do the underlying economic (policy) conditions for the actual EMU resemble those found in the simulations?
More precisely, the question is if the change from the aforementioned conceptual scenario to the real world EMU corresponds qualitatively to the change from the historical baseline to the hypothetical EMU scenarios as postulated in the simulation exercise. The economic conditions in the real world are likely to differ from those in the conceptual scenario. How do nominal interest and exchange rates differ? These two nominal impulses were shown to trigger the effects on the real economy in the simulations on the hypothetical EMU -relative to the baseline. To assess their role in the actual EMU the question can, therefore, be split into two parts: (i) would noteworthy short term interest differentials have remained, if the real world EMU had not been announced in 1992 nor set up in 1999 (conceptual scenario);
(ii) are there reasons that justify deviations of conversion rates in the real world EMU from bilateral exchange rates in the conceptual scenario without EMU? Both questions are answered with a clear yes.
Consider nominal short term interest differentials first. Interest rates observed a few years before the start of the EMU in 1999 already incorporate changes in monetary policy in prospective member countries conducted in anticipation of the start of the real world EMU. Table 1 presents nominal interest rates at various points in time prior to the start of the actual EMU. The interest differential for Germany and Spain, for instance, has shrunk to 1.13 % in January 1998. If interest rates for a situation without the EMU (conceptual scenario) are to be conjectured, one must look at rates prior to the announcement of the real world EMU. In 1992, the year of the Maastricht Treaty, interest rate differentials are large between the Southern countries (e.g. Spain and Italy) and the more stability-oriented so-called core countries, especially Germany, (Austria, and the Netherlands could be added), but also France (since the 'Franc Fort' policies eventually lead to low interest rates in the early 1990s). The data may be seen as evidence for considerable differentials (between European countries) that would have prevailed -at least to some extent -in a conceptual scenario without EMU.
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On this basis, the real world EMU is likely to have caused and still cause large interest rate impulses relative to the conceptual scenario -qualitatively identical to those found in the simulation runs conducted in this paper.
As to exchange rates, consider changes in long term monetary stability (cf. section 3).
Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a formidable effort towards harmonization of monetary policies -at a high level of stability -can be observed. Monetary stability convergence implies less pressure for currencies of low stability countries. In fact, central parities of the ERM which were used as conversion rates in the real world EMU did not have to be changed for most countries after 1992.
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By contrast, in the conceptual scenario without monetary union, there is no reason why monetary stability policies would have harmonized to such a degree in so many European countries. Thus, bilateral exchange rates in a hypothetical situation without the prospect of the EMU (i.e. the conceptual scenario) might well have differed (at least in some countries) from actual conversion rates used in the real world EMU. Thus, relative to the conceptual scenario, the real world exchange rate impulses, too, are likely to be qualitatively identical to those found in the simulations.
Question 2: Do anticipation effects observed in the run-up to the real world EMU correspond to anticipation effects produced by the simulations?
It has already been mentioned that the model does not exactly capture the real world situation. In reality, the period between announcement and actual start of the EMU was longer. Also, there was uncertainty about the prospect of the EMU project altogether.
Hence, anticipated adjustments are likely to be more clear-cut in simulations, with stronger level effects, but less volatility (in an annual model) than in the run-up to the real world EMU.
However, qualitatively, there is strong real world evidence to confirm anticipation effects found in the simulations. Depending on political events and on market expectations on the prospects of the (real world) EMU as well as on participating countries, long run interest rate differentials between potential EMU countries changed drastically (cf. IMF, 2001 and . For instance, the long rate differential for Germany and Italy came down to 3.5 % in 1994, widened again to 5.3 % in 1995 (when Italy's participation in the EMU seemed less likely) and was down at 0.3 % in February 1998 (when markets were convinced that Italy would be a member).
The effect of narrowing long run interest differentials is captured in the simulations. Under all conversion procedures, long rates in all EMU countries equalize around 13 % (CP: 12.5) in 1983, the first year of the hypothetical EMU. In the announcement year 1982, they are between 13 % (CP: 11.5) in Germany (up from 9 % in the baseline) and 15 % (CP: 12.5) in
France and Italy (down from 16 and 20 % respectively).
The validity of anticipation effects for both interest and exchange rates was shown most clearly, when there were rumors that Britain would join the real world EMU as of 1999.
Within a few hours, the British-German (long) interest differential shrank by 22 basis points to only 96. At the same time, the Sterling depreciated by 4 pfennigs to an exchange rate of 2.83 DM, because an even lower conversion rate is said to have been expected (Financial Times, 29 September, 1997).
Question 3: Did countries benefit from the European Monetary Union?
More precisely, the question is if we can make conjectures (or an "educated guess") about the macroeconomic effects of the real world EMU relative to the conceptual scenario. It was argued in question 1 that nominal impulses in simulations conducted in this paper do actually exist in reality, at least qualitatively. However, it was also acknowledged in section 2 that nominal interest rates are lower and the monetary policy is more stabilityoriented in the real world EMU than under the hypothetical EMU scenarios presented in this paper. Acknowledging that the ECB does actually pursue monetary stabilityà la Prima facie, it seems likely that a Pareto-superior outcome (in terms of aggregate output over the longer term) obtains in the real world EMU -relative to the conceptual scenario -compared to the simulation results. This is due to the larger expansionary interest rate impulse for Italy and the elimination of the contractionary interest rate impulse in Germany.
Question 4: Was the interest-exchange trade-off (illustrated in this paper) relevant for decisions associated with the EU Summit in Brussels on 2 May 1998?
Question 4 examines the normative application of simulation findings to real world politics.
Could the knowledge of a potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses have been used for the decisions on membership and conversion rates taken at the EU Summit in Brussels on 2 May 1998? Could it have been used for enabling Britain to be part of the EMU?
Decisions taken at the EU Summit in Brussels were largely determined by political considerations. To avoid haggling over conversion rates central parities of the European Monetary System were used as conversion rates. Even though market rates of all currencies (but the Irish punt) adjusted to them more than a year before the start of the real world EMU, it is questionable if these conversion rates were justified on economic grounds. (In section 4, it was shown for the hypothetical EMU scenario that CP conversion rates did not have an economic justification.) The point can best be demonstrated for the Irish case. Markets generated exchange rates substantially different from conversion rates before 1998. They were still about 6% different in early 1998. The EMS realignment in March 1998 narrowed the gap to about 3%, but market rates gradually depreciated to central parities once the final decision was taken at the Brussels Summit that central parities would be used as conversion rates at the start of the EMU. By doing so, the EMS did not acknowledge market rates, but forced the Irish punt to depreciate.
The findings of this paper suggest that this was unreasonable, at least in the case of Ireland.
Producing an expansionary exchange rate effect meant reinforcing an expansionary interest rate effect which was caused by the reduction of interest rates with the start of the EMU. As a result, Ireland enjoyed a competitive advantage in the EMU, but at the cost of fuelling an already hot economy. Therefore, the competitive edge did not last long. Asset price inflation and imported inflation effects lead to an appreciation of real exchange rates. However, the economic downturn expected by some economists did not happen. The effect of reduced interest rates (which is much stronger than the one caused by depreciating exchange rates)
is corroborated in The Economist as of 14 November 1998. These adverse effects could have been alleviated, if the conversion rates had been adjusted at the start of the EMU.
The interest-exchange trade-off could have also been exploited (along the same lines as for Ireland) to facilitate Britain's membership in the EMU from an economic point of view.
But the decision to stay out of the real world EMU was politically motivated anyway. produced by the transition to a monetary union; and (ii), it is disputed that conversion rates could be indeterminate due to (rational) self-fulfilling prophecies (as argued by de Grauwe, 1997 , Obstfeld, 1998 , and de Grauwe, Dewachter, and Veestraeten, 1999 , if the last quotations of market rates before the start of a monetary union are to be used.
As for the third stage, observations 5 and 6 (in section 5) capture the role of transmission mechanisms and emphasize the potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses. It is shown that the interest rate effect typically determines the overall effect on the real economy. In the fourth stage, results and insights are applied to the real world EMU by examining 4 questions (in section 6). Since economic (policy) conditions are qualitatively captured by the simulation analysis, it is possible to substantiate anticipation effects observed in the run-up to the real world EMU. Furthermore, the knowledge of a potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses can be used in two ways: (i) to make an "educated guess" (for each current member) of the expected overall macroeconomic costs or benefits of joining the EMU; and (ii) to critically review the decisions taken at the EU However, these limitations do not challenge the main findings of this paper for three reasons.
First, interest and exchange rate impulses and real effects discussed here may be affected (or even dominated) by other effects, but they are relevant in any monetary union, nonetheless.
In fact, in Bohn (2002) To conclude, this paper has shown that joining members of any monetary union are likely to experience considerable macroeconomic effects -relative to a situation without monetary union. This is due to changes in interest and exchange rates which are caused by the transition to a monetary union. Although this is conventional wisdom, it was not and still is not accounted for in debate on the EMU. The reason may be that the current discussion lacks sound theoretical and empirical underpinnings, because the transition to the EMU and the period after its actual start are typically not included in the same model. Nonetheless, there is still a need for studying the macroeconomic effects caused by joining a monetary union as there are future EMU candidates and, possibly, other emerging monetary unions.
Various qualitative effects cannot be shown within the framework of a small theoretical model, but require the type of simulation exercise presented here: (i) the endogenous change in depreciation expectations; and (ii) the potential trade-off between interest and exchange rate impulses.
The implications are far-reaching. First, policy makers may consider to use last-day market rates as conversion rates, if such conversion rates are -as shown in this paper -economically sound as well as rationally and uniquely determined (i.e. there is no theoretical indeterminacy problem). As for the EMU, this would be an alternative to fixing conversion rates at central parities of the ERM II. Second, if better understood, the interest-exchange trade-off could be exploited by policy makers to cushion the early implications of membership in any monetary union. This is particularly relevant for the future enlargement of the EMU. All in all, it is vital that policy makers are given the theoretical and empirical basis for the understanding of all effects (micro and macro) produced by joining a monetary union. Finally, I am grateful to the referees for making me rethink some latent features and implications of the simulation results.
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1
In the papers written prior to the start the real world EMU, the procedure for implementing a common currency is either derived from a joint optimization problem for the two hypothetical EMU countries (in Hughes Ma, 1996, and Vines, 1993) or the market exchange rates of the reference model are imposed as bilateral conversion rates (in Masson and Melitz, 1991) .
2
He can formally show that, initially, the devaluing country experiences a real depreciation and a positive effect on the current account and on output. Over the medium term, there is an aggregate expansion, but prices go up, too (due to the excess demand for goods and because of imported inflation effects). In the long run, the real exchange rate and output are back at their original levels.
3
A more complete description of the model can be found in Masson, Symansky, and Meredith (1990) . It includes theoretical underpinnings and estimation details (univariate, muli tivariate, pooled estimations; error correction models; calibrations) as well as examples for using MULTIMOD in policy analyses and standard simulation exercises illustrating the properties of the model. Inter alia cf. also Bohn (1997) for a stylized core model of MULTIMOD, and Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis (1995) for comparisons with other multi-country models.
4
Hill, 1986, p. 140, table 3, bottom line.
5
To be exact, it is not the distance, but the ratio of exchange rates to the US-$ that must be constant. Even though conversion rates are fixed at 1982 exchange rates under CUR, this ratio is typically different in 1982, because interest rates are not yet fully harmonized in the announcement year.
6
In the case of the Dornbusch model, interest rates rise for an increase in the growth rate of the money supply, but remain constant for a level increase.
7
Since the introduction of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 there were numerous devaluations in Italy (and to a lesser extend in France) as well as revaluations in
Germany. This is certainly true up to 1987, but it might have continued in the 1990s, if
Italy had not dropped out of the ERM in 1992, and if the EMU had not been announced.
8
The Fair-Taylor algorithm (Fair and Taylor, 1983 ) contains a Gauss-Seidel algorithm and is more reliable than Newton-Raphson procedures. There is no formal proof that model solutions are unique, but many simulation experiments based on MULTIMOD (for instance, by Hughes Hallett and collaborators, Masson et al., and Wallis et al.) and own sensitivity analyses indicate that unique model solutions can be expected.
9
He presumably refers to the Monetary Conditions Index given by the IMF (1997). The correct ratio for the UK is 3 to 1.
10
It must be admitted that the data in table 1 could be interpreted differently. If we include earlier periods, we could argue that there is a trend towards smaller interest rates and smaller differentials, that would have prevailed with or without the EMU. However, this view ignores effects originating from obligations for the creation of independent central banks and from each country's desire to fulfill the (nominal) Maastricht Criteria.
